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On 2 August both the US and the 
Russian Federation will no longer be 
restrained by the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1987).  
Early this century it gradually became 
clear that Russia wanted to step out of 
the Treaty, by which it felt itself to be 
solely restrained. European nations 
should now take up a greater share of 
the burden of missile defence, which 
should get a broader mission than it has 
today. The debate on EU strategic 
autonomy can be an instrument in this 
endeavour. Because of the worsening 
security environment NATO’s non-
strategic nuclear capability becomes 
even more important.  European NATO 
allies and EU member states may very 
soon be confronted with difficult and 
fundamental choices for a future 
without the INF Treaty, which need to 
be communicated and explained to 
their national population. 
 
In 1979 the USSR deployed its first mobile SS-
20 on the European continent.  In 1985 leading 
experts were expecting that by 1995 Russia 
would deploy up to 3000 nuclear-capable air-, 
sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles, of 
which especially the last category caused serious 
concerns in Europe.  It was the German 
chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD) who insisted 
in 1977 in a speech in London that a Western 
response to these Russian SS-20 deployments 
should be “explored”; for a number of world 
leaders it was increasingly clear that the arms 
race should be reversed. In 1979 NATO’s foreign 
and defence ministers took the “double track 
decision”:  the removal of about 1000 nuclear 
warheads from Europe and, should negotiations 
with the USSR fail, the deployment in Europe 
by NATO of “US ground-launched systems 
comprising 108 Pershing II launchers and 464 
ground launched cruise missiles”. NATO 
recognised that “arms control in constraining 
the Soviet build-up can enhance Alliance 
security, modify the scale of NATO's theatre 
nuclear forces requirements, and promote 
stability and detente in Europe in consonance 
with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, 
defence and detente as enunciated in the Harmel 
Report”.  As from December 1983 Pershing II 
launchers were to be deployed in West-Germany 
and the cruise missiles in Belgium, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the UK.  For Belgium the 
deployment of 48 cruise missiles proved to be 
an extremely difficult decision to take as political 
parties and even a number of governments were 
in complete disagreement. Massive protests with 
perhaps 400,000 demonstrators added to the 
internal pressure on the government.   In the 
end Belgium (1985) almost got isolated within 
the NATO alliance (and even in Moscow it did 
not find a listening ear). 
  
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
2 
 
#1 
 
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE INF 
TREATY 
On 8 December 1987 in Washington president 
Reagan and Soviet general secretary Gorbachev 
signed the INF Treaty, which banned the 
possession, the production or flight-testing of all 
(or: only of) land-based short/medium and 
intermediate range ballistic missiles, cruise 
missiles and missile launchers with ranges 
between 500 and 5500 km.  The prohibition 
applied to both nuclear and conventional 
warheads of ground-launched missiles of the 
Soviet Union and the US. On-site verification 
inspections until the end of 2001 ensured that 
both parties were respecting the Treaty; from 
that moment on compliance was verified by 
other means (a.o. satellite).  The Treaty missed 
permanent verification procedures, which has 
led to suspicion and denials from 2002 onwards, 
as verification mechanisms were no longer in 
place. 
 
On the basis of the INF Treaty the US and the 
USSR by 11 May 1991 had eliminated 2.692 
missiles covered under the Treaty. The Treaty is 
a bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union 
and the US.  With the implosion of the Soviet 
Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw 
Pact four post-soviet states (Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Russian Federation and Ukraine) 
became active participants in the Treaty process, 
but basically the Treaty remains a bilateral 
agreement, with no European nation 
participating or affected.  The Treaty indeed did 
not put any constraints on French and British 
nuclear forces. The Treaty has an unlimited 
duration, but each party has the right (article 
XV) to withdraw from the Treaty with six 
months' notice, "if it decides that extraordinary 
events related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests". 
The far-reaching Treaty was a crucial 
contribution in reducing tensions between the 
USSR and the US at the end of the Cold War.  It 
is noteworthy that neither European nations 
were part of the agreement, nor NATO allies. 
The INF Treaty also had strategic consequences:  
it was the first treaty to eliminate a whole 
category of missiles and it has positively 
influenced later treaties on arms control and 
disarmament (e.g. START). Europe has 
benefited from the landmark agreement as an 
imminent threat of nuclear war was removed 
from the European continent and the Treaty 
contributed to a global arms control architecture 
and “mentality”.  The Treaty “only” eliminated 
land-based missile systems with a range of 500 
to 5500 km.  The current Russian leadership 
views this as a mistake as it is blocked by the 
Treaty from developing and fielding such 
missiles, while in the Pacific realm Moscow is 
confronted with China that is investing in such 
systems. 
 
THE WORSENING EUROPEAN AND 
GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT  
In the last decade Europe has increasingly been 
confronted with a Russian behaviour that is 
challenging the rules-based European security 
order that was put in place after World War II, 
and international law.  Moscow is covertly and 
overtly supporting populist and extremist 
movements all over Europe and is trying to 
undermine the internal stability of European 
nations, using the cyber domain, social media 
and other military and civil instruments of 
power in what can genuinely be called a form of 
constant hybrid warfare.  Russia has actively 
intervened in the domestic politics of North-
Macedonia, Moldova and Georgia to avoid that 
these countries would choose for Euro-Atlantic 
integration.  The use of military force for the 
Russian occupation of two break-away regions 
in Georgia (2008), for the illegal annexation of 
Crimea and the lasting occupation of Donbass 
(2014) do not need more explanation.  The 
Minsk agreements remain without full 
implementation.   
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Although its economy is suffering from Western 
sanctions and low oil prices, Russia is using its 
formidable military industrial complex to invest 
in new and modern capabilities, which are 
reinforcing Russian units in the Black and Baltic 
Sea regions.  Frequent massive and short notice 
military exercises close to the borders of NATO 
allies are a cause of great concern for those 
countries that consider these as a direct military 
threat to their security. In the scenarios for these 
exercises Russia is seamlessly including nuclear 
weapons, which really lowers the nuclear 
threshold considerably.  Noteworthy is the 
deployment of nuclear capable missiles (9K720 
Iskander) to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, 
bordering Lithuania and Poland, two EU 
member states and NATO allies; this 
deployment has upset Western nations.  The use 
of the toxic chemical nerve agent novichok 
against Sergei Skripal in Salisbury (2018) has 
been condemned by all EU member states and 
NATO allies.  Many threads lead to Russian 
capabilities in the MH17 dossier (2014).  The 
Russian intervention in support of Syria’s 
president Assad was forceful and according to 
Western standards not proportionate or 
discriminatory. 
 
According to the Kremlin there is a “serious 
crisis in the relations between Russia and the 
Western States” because “systemic problems in 
the Euro-Atlantic region (…) are manifested in 
the geopolitical expansion pursued by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
European Union (EU) along with their refusal 
to begin implementation of political statements 
regarding the creation of a common European 
security and cooperation framework”. The work 
of the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) for years now has 
been practically paralysed by the worsening of 
the European security situation, and particularly 
after the Russian occupation of parts of 
Georgian and Ukrainian territory. The temperature 
in the Vienna headquarters of the OSCE reflects 
the security in the Euro-Atlantic area.  Russia is 
using multiple political, military, diplomatic and 
economic tools to challenge the rules-based 
international system. 
 
In the Pacific the military rise of China is a 
source of major concern not only for the US, 
but also for Russia.  According to the 2018 
Military Balance China is the only of the 3 global 
nuclear powers possessing intermediate range 
land-launched (mobile) missiles.  On a couple of 
occasions Russian leadership has referred to this 
unbalance.  One should not forget the 
challenges on Russia’s southern flank. 
It is in this general framework of a worsening 
European and global security environment that 
the INF Treaty is another factor of discordance. 
 
EVENTS LEADING TO THE END OF THE 
INF TREATY  
Why did the end of the INF Treaty come about?  
It is believed that Russia soon after the end of 
the verification inspections (2001) started 
developing a new missile system prohibited by 
the Treaty.  Already in 2005 there were reports 
in Russian media that Russia could withdraw 
from the INF Treaty.  In February 2007 
president Putin indirectly expressed the first 
criticism and the intent to quit the INF 
agreement when he declared in his Munich 
speech that “everybody can understand that the 
anti-missile defence system is useless against 
Russia because we have certain weapons that 
easily overcome it.  And we are proceeding in 
this direction”.  Did Putin mean that the Russian 
Federation was already working on a new type 
of cruise missile, that by definition do not follow 
a ballistic trajectory? 
 
That same year his chief of the general staff, 
general Baluyevsky, declared that Russia was 
considering to unilaterally withdraw from the 
INF Treaty in response to NATO’s (envisaged) 
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missile defence system and because “many 
countries were developing and improving 
medium-range missiles”. NATO’s missile 
defence system has been decided upon in 2010 
by allied heads of state and government. By 
welcoming national contributions as “valuable 
to the NATO ballistic missile defence 
architecture”, they sought to expand NATO’s 
existing missile defence capability for the 
protection of deployed forces to also include the 
protection of NATO European territory and 
populations against ballistic missiles from 
outside the Euro-Atlantic area.  NATO’s missile 
defence is lacking the capacity to defend against 
a massive ballistic missile attack like the Russian 
Federation is capable of launching.  It is not a 
violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty that the US and the USSR bilaterally had 
concluded in 1972 and that addressed counter-
strategic ballistic missiles/launchers/radars; by 
the way the Treaty mentions the word 
“strategic” 105 times, but neglects to define it.  
Nowadays it is commonly agreed that strategic 
ballistic missiles have a range of above 5500km.  
The ABM Treaty dealt with national defence of 
the capital and some missile sites against a 
(intercontinental) ballistic missile attack and was 
generally considered as perpetuating the 
mutually assured destruction of the US and the 
USSR during the Cold War.  It was president 
Bush who announced in 2001 that the US would 
withdraw from the Treaty as he felt constrained 
by it in the research and development of new 
ways (sea-launched missiles, laser,…) to counter 
the threat and as he wanted to ensure the 
protection of the US against a possible nuclear 
threat or blackmail by a rogue state. 
 
According to Western reports it is believed that 
in 2008, in Kapustin Yar (near Volgograd, 
formerly Stalingrad), Russia started testing its 
new mobile and hard to detect ground-launched 
cruise missile with a range prohibited by the 
Treaty.  Western experts called the missile “SSC 8”, 
before they found out that the Russian military 
complex was using “9M927”. In June 2013 the 
hawkish chief of staff of the Russian presidential 
administration, Sergei Ivanov, declared that the 
INF Treaty had more benefits for the US as the 
US was not facing regional threats to its security.  
He added that “the Americans have no need for 
this class of weapon, they didn’t need it before 
and they don’t need it now.  They could 
theoretically only attack Mexico and Canada, 
because their effective radius doesn’t extend to 
Europe”. 
 
Since 2013 US has raised its concerns during 
discussions at various senior and technical levels.  
Washington was hoping that Russia would 
return to full and verifiable compliance with the 
Treaty.  Russian officials were still in denial that 
their country was violating the Treaty, which led 
to a next step:  in July 2014, in the midst of the 
Ukraine crisis, president Obama accused 
Moscow of violating the Treaty by testing a 
prohibited ground-launched cruise missile, a 
finding that he conveyed to his Russian 
counterpart in a letter.  Russia simply dismissed 
the accusations as “ungrounded and no 
supporting evidence has been provided”, an 
attitude that has been persistently maintained 
throughout the process:  first complete denial of 
the existence of the 9M729 system, followed by  
a limited admission that the system exists but 
does not violate the INF Treaty. 
 
Starting in January 2014 the US regularly 
updated NATO allies on its findings and policy.  
Washington often took their comments and 
views on board; e.g. at the request of European 
allies the US conceded Russia more time to 
reflect and to return to compliance. 
 
The Russian foreign policy concept, which 
president Putin has approved at the end of 2016, 
enumerates a number of nuclear agreements, but 
almost omits to mention the INF Treaty, if 
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there were not an indirect reference to it:  
“Russia advocates constructive cooperation with 
the US in arms control, with due consideration 
of the inextricable link between strategic 
offensive and defensive warfare, and the 
imperative to make nuclear disarmament a 
multilateral process.  The Russian Federation 
believes that talks on the further reduction of 
strategic offensive arms are only possible when 
taking into account all factors affecting global strategic 
stability, without exception.  Russia views the 
creation of the global missile-defence system by 
the US as a threat to its national security and 
reserves the right to take adequate retaliatory 
measures” (author’s emphasis).  It is hard to 
imagine that ending a nuclear disarmament 
agreement is a retaliatory measure for a non-
strategic ballistic missile defence.  It was clear 
already then that Russia would give up the 
bilateral INF Treaty because it does not take 
into account all factors of global stability, i.e. 
including China. 
 
The heads of state and government of the 
Alliance at their summits in Wales (2014) and 
Warsaw (2016) called “on Russia to preserve the 
viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full 
and verifiable compliance”.  But at their Brussels 
summit (2018) their call got louder and more 
worried as they concluded that “a pattern of 
behaviour and information over many years has 
led to widespread doubts about Russian 
compliance.  Allies believe that, in the absence 
of any credible answer from Russia on this new 
missile, the most plausible assessment would be 
that Russia is in violation of the Treaty.” 
During a marathon annual press conference in 
October 2017 president Putin accused the US of 
unilaterally withdrawing from the INF Treaty.  
He denied again that Russia was in violation and 
referred to NATO’s antimissile system as a 
breach of the Treaty.  At that time he still 
promised that Russia would not withdraw from 
the Treaty.  President Putin put the blame on 
the US, while it was actually Russia that was 
laying the ground for the end of the INF Treaty. 
 
THE US WITHDRAWAL FROM THE INF 
TREATY  
In October 2018 president Trump announced 
that the US would withdraw from the Treaty as 
Russia was no longer in compliance since 
Moscow had developed and fielded the 9M729 
missile system.  This public presidential 
statement and the way the arguments were put 
were not the best example of communication: in 
the eyes of the general public it put the blame 
on Washington, and more particularly on the 
president. In a reaction the European Union 
expected the US and the Russian Federation “to 
remain engaged in constructive dialogue to 
preserve the INF Treaty and ensure its full and 
verifiable implementation which is crucial for 
Europe’s and global security. (…) The world 
doesn’t need a new arms race that would benefit 
no one and on the contrary would bring even 
more instability”.  Both the US and Russia were 
put on an equal footing and no responsibility 
was given to the perpetrator:  this too was not 
the best example of communication by the EU, 
as the consequences of the end of the INF 
Treaty will mainly be for the Europeans to 
bear… 
 
Although a number of NATO Allies still wished 
to salvage the Treaty, the 28 NATO ministers of 
Foreign Affairs have shown solidarity in 
December 2018 in expressing their full support 
to the US:  they found Russia in material breach 
of its obligations under the INF Treaty and 
called on Moscow “to return urgently to full and 
verifiable compliance with the agreement”.  A 
number of them wanted more time in this 
choreography to explain the strategic 
importance of the INF Treaty to their home 
publics, silently hoping that Moscow would 
willingly return to compliance, but that did not 
materialise.  One should also understand that for 
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a number of NATO allies the INF Treaty in these 
months has not always been the political priority 
it could, or rather should have been. 
 
In January 2019 Russian officials in a static 
display for the first time showed a new version 
of the 9M729. This late move was an answer to 
the Western calls for more transparency, but it 
did not take away the concerns of Western 
nations, that even declined the invitation for this 
static show.  The Russian military were 
pretending that the cruise missile had a 
maximum range of 480km: 20km short of the 
INF Treaty minimum range.  Further Russian 
responses led to confusion and obfuscation:  it 
is clear that ending the INF Treaty is not at all 
disliked by the Kremlin. 
 
On 1 February 2019 Washington announced 
that it formally suspended its obligations under 
the Treaty, followed the next day by Russia.  
NATO allies reiterated on 1 February their full 
support for the US’s “action in response to the 
significant risks to Euro-Atlantic security posed 
by Russia”.  They declared that “Russia will bear 
sole responsibility for the end of the INF 
Treaty”.  Washington gave Russia six months’ 
notice to complete withdrawal, which will take 
effect on 2 August. That same day NATO 
secretary general Stoltenberg declared that 
“NATO does not have any intention to deploy 
new land-based nuclear weapons to Europe. 
(…) We don’t have to mirror what Russia does.  
But at the same time we have to make sure that 
we maintain credible and effective deterrence”. 
A few days later the German newspaper 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) reported 
that Russia had deployed more medium-range 
cruise missiles than previously thought:  four 
battalions, each equipped with four launchers 
with four missiles, were stationed in North 
Ossetia, close to Moscow, close to Volgograd, 
and one close to Yekaterinburg.  This would 
mean that today Russia possesses at least 64 
cruise missiles.  Based on input from Western 
experts, the FAZ wrote that the 9M729 has a 
range of 2350km, while Russia maintains its 
position of a range of 481km.  
 
NATO allies keep calling on Russia “to take the 
responsible path”, as NATO secretary general 
Stoltenberg said.  Allies have also expressed 
their concerns directly to Russia when holding 
meetings in the NATO Russia Council format.  
A last opportunity before the final date was a 
meeting at the beginning of July. 
 
POST MORTEM: CONSEQUENCES FOR 
EUROPEAN SECURITY  
It is very hard to imagine that making the INF 
Treaty a multilateral agreement would ever work 
as China (but also India, Iran, Israel,…) will 
most likely never enter in such a framework.  
NATO’s missile defence system has mainly been 
an excuse, for the actual Russian problem with 
the INF is that third parties are not bound by it 
and are building up intermediate-range forces.  
Some weeks ago at an event in Brussels a 
representative of the PRC even declared that 
Beijing simply doesn’t have negotiators for the 
nuclear domain.  A “multilateral INF” is a dead-
end street. 
 
Undoubtedly, the end of the INF Treaty will 
further strain the bilateral relationship between 
Moscow and Washington, as well as risking to 
erode other nuclear negotiations and treaties.  
The steps that both nations are taking are indeed 
not helpful for the global security environment, 
but now is definitely not the time to put the 
transatlantic bond in jeopardy.  Russian officials 
have already warned that “Europe will find itself 
in a sticky situation” .  Russia is well aware that 
its SSC-8 missile can potentially decouple 
American and European security as American 
territory is hardly within reach of the missile.  At 
the same time there is ample potential and risk 
for internal division within NATO on the 
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delicate balance between credible deterrence and 
defence, and a meaningful and constructive 
dialogue with Russia.  Solidarity and cohesion 
remain vitally important for NATO allies today, 
as they were 30 years ago, but equally important 
for EU member states as they are the primary 
targets for Russian missiles in a post INF Treaty 
scenario.  The reduced warning time of its flight 
path will undoubtedly challenge consensus 
decision-making in NATO:  rules of 
engagement should allow military commanders 
to take the necessary decisions. 
 
Work on both components of the security 
balance contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and 
they will be necessary for the sake of European 
security:  NATO will indeed have to find an 
effective deterrent answer to the challenges 
Russia’s capabilities are posing, but NATO allies 
should also work and find ways to improve 
transparency through dialogue with Russia, 
which can be organised in the NATO Russia 
Council or, perhaps more importantly, in the 
framework of the OSCE.   
 
The proliferation of offensive and defensive 
missile systems, technology and programmes 
will increasingly set the tone in the coming years, 
especially as 26 countries (including North 
Korea or Iran) have taken major steps forward.  
First, NATO should work internally on a better 
understanding and information-sharing on the 
challenge.  Second, only a few European nations 
have some antimissile defence capacity, but a 
European industrial base and knowhow do exist.  
In the current security environment and in a 
future without the INF Treaty, European 
NATO allies should take up a greater share of 
the burden of missile defence, which is by 
definition purely defensive in nature and should 
therefore be more politically acceptable.  Today 
NATO’s ballistic missile defence is not capable 
of defending European territory against Russian 
missiles; it even is only directed against certain 
threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.  
More broadly, NATO’s defence planning 
process could take into account all 
consequences of the new security environment 
for both conventional and nuclear capabilities in 
order to preserve a credible deterrence and 
effective defence in a world without the INF 
Treaty:  the enabling role of this process would 
also ensure an equitable burden sharing among 
European NATO allies. 
 
If the new Russian nuclear capabilities are truly 
considered to pose a threat to Europe, the 
lingering debate on EU strategic autonomy 
should seriously take up this element:  this 
would clearly demonstrate that Europeans feel 
the need to assume more responsibility for their 
own security at a critical moment in history:  
Europeans should become less dependent on 
American antimissile systems and become 
actors, instead of the spectators they have been 
during the times of the INF Treaty.  In this 
light, EU strategic autonomy would truly work 
hand in glove with NATO’s mission of 
deterrence and defend.  As long as Europe 
remains absent as a strategic actor, only the great 
powers will continue to talk about European 
security, and they will do so in the absence of 
European nations. 
 
As Russia is re-introducing systems that were 
eliminated by the INF Treaty, NATO’s non-
strategic nuclear capability becomes more 
important as, besides the British submarine 
launched missiles, it is the only nuclear capability 
to protect the European territory and to 
safeguard Europe from any blackmail or 
intimidation.  NATO’s non-strategic nuclear 
capability is the only one for which European 
nations hold 1 of the 2 operational keys to 
launch European dual-capable fighter aircraft 
with the American B61 nuclear bomb, for which 
they offer important national contributions to 
NATO’s nuclear deterrence mission and on 
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which they truly have a say at the NATO table.  
France is not a member of NATO’s nuclear 
planning group and operationally is not 
participating with its force de frappe in NATO’s 
nuclear deterrent, a remnant of president De 
Gaulle’s decision in the 1960s when he had lost 
confidence in Washington’s supreme security 
guarantee.  This demonstrates that a European 
initiative for nuclear strategic autonomy is highly 
unlikely, as nuclear capabilities such as the force 
de frappe will remain at the heart of national 
sovereignty.  Maintaining nuclear sharing within 
NATO remains highly desirable therefore, as 
“the supreme guarantee of the security of the 
Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces 
of the Alliance”, which “as long as nuclear 
weapons exist, will remain a nuclear alliance.”  
This will definitely not change in a world 
without the INF Treaty. 
 
Is there a role for the European Union in a 
future without an INF Treaty?  As long as the 
EU is not a credible actor, most likely matters of 
direct strategic and vital importance for Europe 
will continue to be discussed and negotiated 
above the heads of Europeans.  Of course, 
European nations and the EU can continue to 
insist on the importance of arms control, 
disarmament, confidence building measures etc., 
and they can try to diplomatically influence the 
policies in Washington and perhaps also in 
Moscow.  European nations will undoubtedly 
do so.  However, the impact of such European 
approaches will be measured against the 
credibility of European power and against the 
capabilities European nations can bring to bear 
in the field of missiles, nuclear capability, 
launchers, countermeasures,.. .  And today these 
are all very limited. 
 
The momentum of the process that the 
American ally in NATO has started in 2014 
should be maintained:  this allied dialogue 
fosters transparency and confidence.  Such a 
process directly informs the highest political 
levels in all NATO capitals and it assists those 
capitals in explaining to their publics what is 
happening.  Washington should further inform 
European allies of steps it is undertaking to 
avoid a new arms race, to promote safety and 
security at the lowest effective level, to protect 
the territories and populations of NATO allies 
against risks and threats in post-INF times.  
Through talking and listening to allies, in other 
words through a multilateral approach within 
NATO, Washington stands stronger in 
addressing security issues with Moscow. 
 
And finally, but not least, it is time that Western 
nations communicate more transparently 
towards their publics on the risks, on their 
intentions and on their foreign security policy.  
Stark choices will have to be made by 
Europeans: a new arms race, deployment of US 
missiles in Europe, acceptance of a risk of 
intimidation by Russia, a European antimissile 
capacity,...  Populations must understand better 
why NATO and the EU are essential to 
European security.  A world without nuclear 
weapons today is out of reach.  In the current 
security environment nuclear capabilities remain 
central to European security.  It is indispensable 
that European capitals shed more light on how 
this role is accomplished and on how they see 
their security guarantee without the INF Treaty. 
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